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Invited Paper: 
THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON,1 U.S. Geological Survey, Biological Resources Division, Northern Prairie Wildlife Research Center, 
Jamestown, ND 58401, USA 
Abstract: Despite their wide use in scientific journals such as The Journal of Wildlife Management, statistical 
hypothesis tests add very little value to the products of research. Indeed, they frequently confuse the inter- 
prettation of data. This paper describes how statistical hypothesis tests are often viewed, and then contrasts 
that interpretation with the correct one. I discuss the arbitrariness of P-values, conclusions that the null hy- 
pothesis is true, power analysis, and distinctions between statistical and biological significance. Statistical hy- 
pothesis testing, in which the null hypothesis about the properties of a population is almost always known a 
priori to be false, is contrasted with scientific hypothesis testing, which examines a credible null hypothesis 
about phenomena in nature. More meaningful alternatives are briefly outlined, including estimation and con- 
fidence intervals for determining the importance of factors, decision theory for guiding actions in the face of 
uncertainty, and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing and other statistical practices. 
JOURNAL OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 63(3):763-772 
Key words: Bayesian approaches, confidence interval, null hypothesis, P-value, power analysis, scientific hy- 
pothesis test, statistical hypothesis test. 
Statistical testing of hypotheses in the wildlife 
field has increased dramatically in recent years. 
Even more recent is an emphasis on power 
analysis associated with hypothesis testing (The 
Wildlife Society 1995). While this trend was oc- 
curring, statistical hypothesis testing was being 
deemphasized in some other disciplines. As an 
example, the American Psychological Associa- 
tion seriously debated a ban on presenting re- 
sults of such tests in the Association's scientific 
journals. That proposal was rejected, not be- 
cause it lacked merit, but due to its appearance 
of censorship (Meehl 1997). 
The issue was highlighted at the 1998 annual 
conference of The Wildlife Society, in Buffalo, 
New York, where the Biometrics Working 
Group sponsored a half-day symposium on 
Evaluating the Role of Hypothesis Testing- 
Power Analysis in Wildlife Science. Speakers at 
that session who addressed statistical hypothesis 
testing were virtually unanimous in their opin- 
ion that the tool was overused, misused, and 
often inappropriate. 
My objectives are to briefly describe statisti- 
cal hypothesis testing, discuss common but in- 
correct interpretations of resulting P-values, 
mention some shortcomings of hypothesis test- 
ing, indicate why hypothesis testing is conduct- 
ed, and outline some alternatives. 
1 E-mail: douglas-h_johnson@nbs.gov 
WHAT IS STATISTICAL HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING? 
Four basic steps constitute statistical hypoth- 
esis testing. First, one develops a null hypothesis 
about some phenomenon or parameter. This null 
hypothesis is generally the opposite of the re- 
search hypothesis, which is what the investigator 
truly believes and wants to demonstrate. Re- 
search hypotheses may be generated either in- 
ductively, from a study of observations already 
made, or deductively, deriving from theory. Next, 
data are collected that bear on the issue, typically 
by an experiment or by sampling. (Null hypoth- 
eses often are developed after the data are in 
hand and have been rummaged through, but 
that's another topic.) A statistical test of the null 
hypothesis then is conducted, which generates a 
P-value. Finally, the question of what that value 
means relative to the null hypothesis is consid- 
ered. Several interpretations of P often are made. 
Sometimes P is viewed as the probability that 
the results obtained were due to chance. Small 
values are taken to indicate that the results were 
not just a happenstance. A large value of P, say 
for a test that 1i = 0, would suggest that the 
mean x actually recorded was due to chance, 
and [p could be assumed to be zero (Schmidt 
and Hunter 1997). 
Other times, 1-P is considered the reliability 
of the result; that is, the probability of getting- 
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the same result if the experiment were repeat- 
ed. Significant differences are often termed "re- 
liable" under this interpretation. 
Alternatively, P can be treated as the proba- 
bility that the null hypothesis is true. This in- 
terpretation is the most direct one, as it ad- 
dresses head-on the question that interests the 
investigator. 
These 3 interpretations are what Carver 
(1978) termed fantasies about statistical signifi- 
cance. None of them is true, although they are 
treated as if they were true in some statistical 
textbooks and applications papers. Small values 
of P are taken to represent strong evidence that 
the null hypothesis is false, but workers dem- 
onstrated long ago (see references in Berger 
and Sellke 1987) that such is not the case. In 
fact, Berger and Sellke (1987) gave an example 
for which a P-value of 0.05 was attained with a 
sample of n = 50, but the probability that the 
null hypothesis was true was 0.52. Further, the 
disparity between P and Pr[H0 I data], the prob- 
ability of the null hypothesis given the observed 
data, increases as samples become larger. 
In reality, P is the Pr[observed or more ex- 
treme data I Ho], the probability of the observed 
data or data more extreme, given that the null 
hypothesis is true, the assumed model is cor- 
rect, and the sampling was done randomly. Let 
us consider the first 2 assumptions. 
What are More Extreme Data? 
Suppose you have a sample consisting of 10 
males and 3 females. For a null hypothesis of a 
balanced sex ratio, what samples would be more 
extreme? The answer to that question depends 
on the sampling plan used to collect the data 
(i.e., what stopping rule was used). The most 
obvious answer is based on the assumption that 
a total of 13 individuals was sampled. In that 
case, outcomes more extreme than 10 males 
and 3 females would be 11 males and 2 females, 
12 males and 1 female, and 13 males and no 
females. 
However, the investigator might have decided 
to stop sampling as soon as he encountered 10 
males. Were that the situation, the possible out- 
comes more extreme against the null hypothesis 
would be 10 males and 2 females, 10 males and 
1 female, and 10 males and no females. Converse- 
ly, the investigator might have collected data until 
3 females were encountered. The number of 
more extreme outcomes then are infinite: they in- 
clude 11 males and 3 females, 12 males and 3 
females, 13 males and 3 females, etc. Alternative- 
ly, the investigator might have collected data until 
the difference between the numbers of males and 
females was 7, or until the difference was signif- 
icant at some level. Each set of more extreme 
outcomes has its own probability, which, along 
with the probability of the result actually ob- 
tained, constitutes P 
The point is that determining which outcomes 
of an experiment or survey are more extreme 
than the observed one, so a P-value can be cal- 
culated, requires knowledge of the intentions of 
the investigator (Berger and Berry 1988). Hence, 
P, the outcome of a statistical hypothesis test, de- 
pends on results that were not obtained; that is, 
something that did not happen, and what the 
intentions of the investigator were. 
Are Null Hypotheses Really True? 
P is calculated under the assumption that the 
null hypothesis is true. Most null hypotheses 
tested, however, state that some parameter 
equals zero, or that some set of parameters are 
all equal. These hypotheses, called point null 
hypotheses, are almost invariably known to be 
false before any data are collected (Berkson 
1938, Savage 1957, Johnson 1995). If such hy- 
potheses are not rejected, it is usually because 
the sample size is too small (Nunnally 1960). 
To see if the null hypotheses being tested in 
The Journal of Wildlife Management can validly 
be considered to be true, I arbitrarily selected 
2 issues: an issue from the 1996 volume, the 
other from 1998. I scanned the results section 
of each paper, looking for P-values. For each P- 
value I found, I looked back to see what hy- 
pothesis was being tested. I made a very biased 
selection of some conclusions reached by re- 
jecting null hypotheses; these include: (1) the 
occurrence of sheep remains in coyote (Canis 
latrans) scats differed among seasons (P = 0.03, 
n = 467), (2) duckling body mass differed 
among years (P < 0.0001), and (3) the density 
of large trees was greater in unlogged forest 
stands than in logged stands (P = 0.02). (The 
last is my personal favorite.) Certainly we knew 
before any data were collected that the null hy- 
potheses being tested were false. Sheep remains 
certainly must have varied among seasons, if 
only between 61.1% in 1 season and 61.2% in 
another. The only question was whether or not 
the sample size was sufficient to detect the dif- 
ference. Likewise, we know before data are col- 
lected that there are real differences in the oth- 
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er examples, which are what Abelson (1997) re- 
ferred to as "gratuitous" significance testing- 
testing what is already known. 
Three comments in favor of the point null 
hypothesis, such as pL = L0o. First, while such 
hypotheses are virtually always false for sam- 
pling studies, they may be reasonable for ex- 
perimental studies in which subjects are ran- 
domly assigned to treatment groups (Mulaik et 
al. 1997). Second, testing a point null hypothesis 
in fact does provide a reasonable approximation 
to a more appropriate question: is ,L nearly 
equal to X0o (Berger and Delampady 1987, Ber- 
ger and Sellke 1987), if the sample size is mod- 
est (Rindskopf 1997). Large sample sizes will 
result in small P-values even if Ji is nearly equal 
to pL0. Third, testing the point null hypothesis is 
mathematically much easier than testing com- 
posite null hypotheses, which involve noncen- 
trality parameters (Steiger and Fouladi 1997). 
The bottom line on P-values is that they re- 
late to data that were not observed under a 
model that is known to be false. How meaning- 
ful can they be? But they are objective, at least; 
or are they? 
P is Arbitrary 
If the null hypothesis truly is false (as most of 
those tested really are), then P can be made as 
small as one wishes, by getting a large enough 
sample. P is a function of (1) the difference be- 
tween reality and the null hypothesis, and (2) the 
sample size. Suppose, for example, that you are 
testing to see if the mean of a population (p.) is, 
say, 100. The null hypothesis then is Ho: pL = 
100, versus the alternative hypothesis of Hi: p. 7# 
100. One might use Student's t-test, which is 
t -00) x V(n- 1), S 
where x is the mean of the sample, S is the 
standard deviation of the sample, and n is the 
sample size. Clearly, t can be made arbitrarily 
large (and the P-value associated with it arbitrari- 
ly small) by making either (x - 100) or 
V(n-1) large enough. As the sample size in- 
creases, (x - 100) and S will approximately sta- 
bilize at the true parameter values. Hence, a 
large value of n translates into a large value of 
t. This strong dependence of P on the sample 
size led Good (1982) to suggest that P-values be 
standardized to a sample size of 100, by replac- 
ing P by P n/10 (or 0.5, if that is smaller). 
Even more arbitrary in a sense than P is the 
use of a standard cutoff value, usually denoted 
a. P-values less than or equal to a are deemed 
significant; those greater than a are nonsignifi- 
cant. Use of a was advocated by Jerzy Neyman 
and Egon Pearson, whereas R. A. Fisher rec- 
ommended presentation of observed P-values 
instead (Huberty 1993). Use of a fixed a level, 
say a = 0.05, promotes the seemingly nonsen- 
sical distinction between a significant finding if 
P = 0.049, and a nonsignificant finding if P = 
0.051. Such minor differences are illusory any- 
way, as they derive from tests whose assump- 
tions often are only approximately met (Preece 
1990). Fisher objected to the Neyman-Pearson 
procedure because of its mechanical, automat- 
ed nature (Mulaik et al. 1997). 
Proving the Null Hypothesis 
Discourses on hypothesis testing emphasize 
that null hypotheses cannot be proved, they can 
only be disproved (rejected). Failing to reject a 
null hypothesis does not mean that it is true. 
Especially with small samples, one must be 
careful not to accept the null hypothesis. Con- 
sider a test of the null hypothesis that a mean 
pL equals p.0. The situations illustrated in Figure 
1 both reflect a failure to reject that hypothesis. 
Figure 1A suggests the null hypothesis may well 
be false, but the sample was too small to indi- 
cate significance; there is a lack of power. Con- 
versely, Figure lB shows that the data truly 
were consistent with the null hypothesis. The 2 
situations should lead to different conclusions 
about p., but the P-values associated with the 
tests are identical. 
Taking another look at the 2 issues of The 
Journal of Wildlife Management, I noted a num- 
ber of articles that indicated a null hypothesis 
was proven. Among these were (1) no difference 
in slope aspect of random snags (P = 0.112, n = 
57), (2) no difference in viable seeds (F26 = 3.18, 
P = 0.11), (3) lamb kill was not correlated to 
trapper hours (r12 = 0.50, P = 0.095), (4) no 
effect due to month (P = 0.07, n = 15), and (5) 
no significant differences in survival distributions 
(P-values > 0.014!, n variable). I selected the ex- 
amples to illustrate null hypotheses claimed to 
be true, despite small sample sizes and P-values 
that were small but (usually) >0.05. All exam- 
ples, I believe, reflect the lack of power (Fig. 1A) 
while claiming a lack of effect (Fig. 1B). 
Power Analysis 
Power analysis is an adjunct to hypothesis 
testing that has become increasingly popular 
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Table 1. Reaction of investigator to results of a statistical sig- 
nificance test (after Nester 1996). 
Statistical significance Practical importance 
of observed difference Not significant Significant 
Not important Happy Annoyed 
Important Very sad Elated 
. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ iii 
ho H 
LACK OF POWER 
B 
LACK OF EFFECT 
Fig. 1. Results of a test that failed to reject the null hypothesis 
that a mean L equals p,o. Shaded areas indicate regions for 
which hypothesis would be rejected. (A) suggests the null hy- 
pothesis may well be false, but the sample was too small to 
indicate significance; there is a lack of power. (B) suggests the 
data truly were consistent with the null hypothesis. 
(Peterman 1990, Thomas and Krebs 1997). The 
procedure can be used to estimate the sample 
size needed to have a specified probability 
(power = 1 - 13) of declaring as significant (at 
the oa level) a particular difference or effect (ef- 
fect size). As such, the process can usefully be 
used to design a survey or experiment (Gerard 
et al. 1998). Its use is sometimes recommended 
to ascertain the power of the test after a study 
has been conducted and nonsignificant results 
obtained (The Wildlife Society 1995). The no- 
tion is to guard against wrongly declaring the 
null hypothesis to be true. Such retrospective 
power analysis can be misleading, however. 
Steidl et al. (1997:274) noted that power esti- 
mated with the data used to test the null hy- 
pothesis and the observed effect size is mean- 
ingless, as a high P-value will invariably result 
in low estimated power. Retrospective power 
estimates may be meaningful if they are com- 
puted with effect sizeS different from the ob- 
served effect size. Power analysis programs, 
however, assume the input values for effect and 
variance are known, rather than estimated, so 
they give misleadingly high estimates of power 
(Steidl et al. 1997, Gerard et al. 1998). In ad- 
dition, although statistical hypothesis testing in- 
vokes what I believe to be 1 rather arbitrary 
parameter (oa or P), power analysis requires 3 of 
them (a, 13, effect size). For further comments 
see Shaver (1993:309), who termed power anal- 
ysis "a vacuous intellectual game," and who not- 
ed that the tendency to use criteria, such as Co- 
hen's (1988) standards for small, medium, and 
large effect sizes, is as mindless as the practice 
of using the a = 0.05 criterion in statistical sig- 
nificance testing. Questions about the likely size 
of true effects can be better addressed with 
confidence intervals than with retrospective 
power analyses (e.g., Steidl et al. 1997, Steiger 
and Fouladi 1997). 
Biological Versus Statistical Significance 
Many authors make note of the distinction 
between statistical significance and subject-mat- 
ter (in our case, biological) significance. Unim- 
portant differences or effects that do not attain 
significance are okay, and important differences 
that do show up significant are excellent, for 
they facilitate publication (Table 1). Unimpor- 
tant differences that turn out significant are an- 
noying, and important differences that fail sta- 
tistical detection are truly depressing. Recalling 
our earlier comments about the effect of sample 
size on P-values, the 2 outcomes that please the 
researcher suggest the sample size was about 
right (Table 2). The annoying unimportant dif- 
Table 2. Interpretation of sample size as related to results of 
a statistical significance test. 
Statistical significance Practical importance 
of observed difference Not significant Significant 
Not important n okay n too big 
Important n too small n okay 
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ferences that were significant indicate that too 
large a sample was obtained. Further, if an im- 
portant difference was not significant, the in- 
vestigator concludes that the sample was insuf- 
ficient and calls for further research. This 
schizophrenic nature of the interpretation of 
significance greatly reduces its value. 
Other Comments on Hypothesis Tests 
Statistical hypothesis testing has received an 
enormous amount of criticism, and for a rather 
long time. In 1963, Clark (1963:466) noted that 
it was "no longer a sound or fruitful basis for 
statistical investigation." Bakan (1966:436) 
called it "essential mindlessness in the conduct 
of research." The famed quality guru W. Ed- 
wards Deming (1975) commented that the rea- 
son students have problems understanding hy- 
pothesis tests is that they may be trying to think. 
Carver (1978) recommended that statistical sig- 
nificance testing should be eliminated; it is not 
only useless, it is also harmful because it is in- 
terpreted to mean something else. Guttman 
(1985) recognized that "In practice, of course, 
tests of significance are not taken seriously." 
Loftus (1991) found it difficult to imagine a less 
insightful way to translate data into conclusions. 
Cohen (1994:997) noted that statistical testing 
of the null hypothesis "does not tell us what we 
want to know, and we so much want to know 
what we want to know that, out of desperation, 
we nevertheless believe that it does!" Barnard 
(1998:47) argued that ". . . simple P-values are 
not now used by the best statisticians." These 
examples are but a fraction of the comments 
made by statisticians and users of statistics 
about the role of statistical hypothesis testing. 
While many of the arguments against signifi- 
cance tests stem from their misuse, rather than 
their intrinsic values (Mulaik et al. 1997), I be- 
lieve that 1 of their intrinsic problems is that 
they do encourage misuse. 
WHY ARE HYPOTHESIS TESTS USED? 
With all the deficiencies of statistical hypoth- 
esis tests, it is reasonable to wonder why they 
remain so widely used. Nester (1996) suggested 
several reasons: (1) they appear to be objective 
and exact; (2) they are readily available and eas- 
ily invoked in many commercial statistics pack- 
ages; (3) everyone else seems to use them; (4) 
students, statisticians, and scientists are taught 
to use them; and (5) some journal editors and 
thesis supervisors demand them. Carver (1978) 
recognized that statistical significance is gener- 
ally interpreted as having some relation to rep- 
lication, which is the cornerstone of science. 
More cynically, Carver (1978) suggested that 
complicated mathematical procedures lend an 
air of scientific objectivity to conclusions. Shav- 
er (1993) noted that social scientists equate be- 
ing quantitative with being scientific. D. V. 
Lindley (quoted in Matthews 1997) observed 
that "People like conventional hypothesis tests 
because it's so easy to get significant results 
from them." 
I attribute the heavy use of statistical hypoth- 
esis testing, not just in the wildlife field but in 
other "soft" sciences such as psychology, soci- 
ology, and education, to "physics envy." Physi- 
cists and other researchers in the "hard" sci- 
ences are widely respected for their ability to 
learn things about the real world (and universe) 
that are solid and incontrovertible, and also 
yield results that translate into products that we 
see daily. Psychologists, for 1 group, have diffi- 
culty developing tests that are able to distin- 
guish 2 competing theories. 
In the hard sciences, hypotheses are tested; 
that process is an integral component of the hy- 
pothetico-deductive scientific method. Under 
that method, a theory is postulated, which gen- 
erates several predictions. These predictions are 
treated as scientific hypotheses, and an experi- 
ment is conducted to try to falsify each hypoth- 
esis. If the results of the experiment refute the 
hypothesis, that outcome implies that the theory 
is incorrect and should be modified or scrapped. 
If the results do not refute the hypothesis, the 
theory stands and may gain support, depending 
on how critical the experiment was. 
In contrast, the hypotheses usually tested by 
wildlife ecologists do not devolve from general 
theories about how the real world operates. 
More typically they are statistical hypotheses 
(i.e., statements about properties of popula- 
tions; Simberloff 1990). Unlike scientific hy- 
potheses, the truth of which is truly in question, 
most statistical hypotheses are known a priori to 
be false. The confusion of the 2 types of hy- 
potheses has been attributed to the pervasive 
influence of R. A. Fisher, who did not distin- 
guish them (Schmidt and Hunter 1997). 
Scientific hypothesis testing dates back at 
least to the 17th century: in 1620, Francis Ba- 
con discussed the role of proposing alternative 
explanations and conducting explicit tests to dis- 
tinguish between them as the most direct route 
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to scientific understanding (Quinn and Dunham 
1983). This concept is related to Popperian in- 
ference, which seeks to develop and test hy- 
potheses that can clearly be falsified (Popper 
1959), because a falsified hypothesis provides 
greater advance in understanding than does a 
hypothesis that is supported. Also similar is 
Platt's (1964) notion of strong inference, which 
emphasizes developing alternative hypotheses 
that lead to different predictions. In such a case, 
results inconsistent with predictions from a hy- 
pothesis cast doubt of its validity. 
Examples of scientific hypotheses, which 
were considered credible, include Copernicus' 
notion HA: the Earth revolves around the sun, 
versus the conventional wisdom of the time, Ho: 
the sun revolves around the Earth. Another ex- 
ample is Fermat's last theorem, which states 
that for integers n, X, Y, and Z, Xn + yn = Zn 
implies n - 2. Alternatively, a physicist may 
make specific predictions about a parameter 
based on a theory, and the theory is provision- 
ally accepted only if the outcomes are within 
measurement error of the predicted value, and 
no other theories make predictions that also fall 
within that range (Mulaik et al. 1997). Contrast 
these hypotheses, which involve phenomena in 
nature, with the statistical hypotheses presented 
in The Journal of Wildlife Management, which 
were mentioned above, and which involve prop- 
erties of populations. 
Rejection of a statistical hypothesis would con- 
stitute a piece of evidence to be considered in 
deciding whether or not to reject a scientific hy- 
pothesis (Simberloff 1990). For example, a sci- 
entific hypothesis might state that clutch sizes of 
birds increase with the age of the bird, up to 
some plateau. That idea would generate a hy- 
pothesis that could be tested statistically within 
a particular population of birds. A single such 
test, regardless of its P-value, would little affect 
the credibility of the scientific hypothesis, which 
is far more general. A related distinction is that 
scientific hypotheses are global, applying to all of 
nature, while statistical hypotheses are local, ap- 
plying to particular systems (Simberloff 1990). 
Why do we wildlife ecologists rarely test sci- 
entific hypotheses? My view is that we are deal- 
ing with systems more complex than those faced 
by physicists. A saying in ecology is that every- 
thing is connected to everything else. (In psy- 
chology, "everything correlates with everything," 
giving rise to what David Lykken called the 
"crud factor" for such ambient correlation noise 
[Meehl 1997]). This saying implies that all vari- 
ables in an ecological system are intercorrelated, 
and that any null hypothesis postulating no effect 
of a variable on another will in fact be false; a 
statistical test of that hypothesis will be rejected, 
as long as the sample is sufficiently large. This 
line of reasoning does not denigrate the value of 
experimentation in real systems; ecologists 
should seek situations in which variables thought 
to be influential can be manipulated and the re- 
sults carefully monitored (Underwood 1997). 
Too often, however, experimentation in natural 
systems is very difficult if not impossible. 
REPLICATION 
Replication is a cornerstone of science. If re- 
sults from a study cannot be reproduced, they 
have no credibility. Scale is important here. 
Conducting the same study at the same time 
but at several different sites and getting com- 
parable results is reassuring, but not nearly so 
convincing as having different investigators 
achieve similar results using different methods 
in different areas at different times. R. A. Fish- 
er's idea of solid knowledge was not a single 
extremely significant result, but rather the abil- 
ity of repeatedly getting results significant at 5% 
(Tukey 1969). Shaver (1993:304) observed that 
"The question of interest is whether an effect 
size of a magnitude judged to be important has 
been consistently obtained across valid replica- 
tions. Whether any or all of the results are sta- 
tistically significant is irrelevant." Replicated re- 
sults automatically make statistical significance 
testing unnecessary (Bauemfeind 1968). 
Individual studies rarely contain sufficient in- 
formation to support a final conclusion about the 
truth or value of a hypothesis (Schmidt and 
Hunter 1997). Studies differ in design, measure- 
ment devices, samples included, weather condi- 
tions, and many other ways. This variability 
among studies is more pervasive in ecological sit- 
uations than in, for example, the physical scienc- 
es (Ellison 1996). To have generality, results 
should be consistent under a wide variety of cir- 
cumstances. Meta-analysis provides some tools 
for combining information from repeated studies 
(e.g., Hedges and Olkin 1985) and can reduce 
dependence on significance testing by examining 
replicated studies (Schmidt and Hunter 1997). 
Meta-analysis can be dangerously misleading, 
however, if nonsignificant results or results that 
did not conform to the conventional wisdom 
were less likely to have been published. 
J. Wildl. Manage. 63(3):1999 
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WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? 
What should we do instead of testing hypoth- 
eses? As Quinn and Dunham (1983) pointed 
out, it is more fruitful to determine the relative 
importance to the contributions of, and inter- 
actions between, a number of processes. For 
this purpose, estimation is far more appropriate 
than hypothesis testing (Campbell 1992). For 
certain other situations, decision theory is an 
appropriate tool. For either of these applica- 
tions, as well as for hypothesis testing itself, the 
Bayesian approach offers some distinct advan- 
tages over the traditional methods. These alter- 
natives are briefly outlined below. Although the 
alternatives will not meet all potential needs, 
they do offer attractive choices in many fre- 
quently encountered situations. 
Estimates and Confidence Intervals 
Four decades ago, Anscombe (1956) ob- 
served that statistical hypothesis tests were to- 
tally irrelevant, and that what was needed were 
estimates of magnitudes of effects, with stan- 
dard errors. Yates (1964) indicated that "The 
most commonly occurring weakness in the ap- 
plication of Fisherian methods is undue em- 
phasis on tests of significance, and failure to 
recognize that in many types of experimental 
work estimates of the treatment effects, togeth- 
er with estimates of the errors to which they are 
subject, are the quantities of primary interest." 
Further, because wildlife ecologists want to in- 
fluence management practices, Johnson (1995) 
noted that, "If ecologists are to be taken seri- 
ously by decision makers, they must provide in- 
formation useful for deciding on a course of ac- 
tion, as opposed to addressing purely academic 
questions." To enforce that point, several edu- 
cation and psychological journals have adopted 
editorial policies requiring that parameter esti- 
mates accompany any P-values be presented 
(McLean and Ernest 1998). 
Ordinary confidence intervals provide more 
information than do P-values. Knowing that a 
95% confidence interval includes zero tells one 
that, if a test of the hypothesis that the param- 
eter equals zero is conducted, the resulting P- 
value will be >0.05. A confidence interval pro- 
vides both an estimate of the effect size and a 
measure of its uncertainty. A 95% confidence 
interval of, say, (-50, 300) suggests the param- 
eter is less well estimated than would a confi- 
dence interval of (120, 130). Perhaps surpris- 
ingly, confidence intervals have a longer history 
than statistical hypothesis tests (Schmidt and 
Hunter 1997). 
With its advantages and longer history, why 
have confidence intervals not been used more 
than they have? Steiger and Fouladi (1997) and 
Reichardt and Gollob (1997) posited several ex- 
planations: (1) hypothesis testing has become a 
tradition; (2) the advantages of confidence in- 
tervals are not recognized; (3) there is some ig- 
norance of the procedures available; (4) major 
statistical packages do not include many confi- 
dence interval estimates; (5) sizes of parameter 
estimates are often disappointingly small, even 
though they may be very significantly different 
from zero; (6) the wide confidence intervals that 
often result from a study are embarrassing; (7) 
some hypothesis tests (e.g., chi-square contin- 
gency table) have no uniquely defined param- 
eter associated with them; and (8) recommen- 
dations to use confidence intervals often are ac- 
companied by recommendations to abandon 
statistical tests altogether, which is unwelcome 
advice. These reasons are not valid excuses for 
avoiding confidence intervals in lieu of hypoth- 
esis tests in situations for which parameter es- 
timation is the objective. 
Decision Theory 
Often experiments or surveys are conducted to 
help make some decision, such as what limits to 
set on hunting seasons, if a forest stand should be 
logged, or if a pesticide should be approved. In 
those cases, hypothesis testing is inadequate, for 
it does not take into consideration the costs of 
alternative actions. Here a useful tool is statistical 
decision theory: the theory of acting rationally 
with respect to anticipated gains and losses, in the 
face of uncertainty. Hypothesis testing generally 
limits the probability of a Type I error (rejecting 
a true null hypothesis), often arbitrarily set at a 
= 0.05, while letting the probability of a Type II 
error (accepting a false null hypothesis) fall where 
it may. In ecological situations, however, a Type 
II error may be far more costly than a Type I 
error (Toft and Shea 1983). As an example, ap- 
proving a pesticide that reduces the survival rate 
of an endangered species by 5% may be disas- 
trous to that species, even if that change is not 
statistically detectable. As another, continued 
overharvest in marine fisheries may result in the 
collapse of the ecosystem even while statistical 
tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis that 
fishing has no effect (Dayton 1998). Details on 
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decision theory can be found in DeGroot (1970), 
Berger (1985), and Pratt et al. (1995). 
Model Selection 
Statistical tests can play a useful role in di- 
agnostic checks and evaluations of tentative sta- 
tistical models (Box 1980). But even for this ap- 
plication, competing tools are superior. Infor- 
mation criteria, such as Akaike's, provide objec- 
tive measures for selecting among different 
models fitted to a dataset. Burnham and An- 
derson (1998) provided a detailed overview of 
model selection procedures based on informa- 
tion criteria. In addition, for many applications 
it is not advisable to select a "best" model and 
then proceed as if that model was correct. 
There may be a group of models entertained, 
and the data will provide different strength of 
evidence for each model. Rather than basing 
decisions or conclusions on the single model 
most strongly supported by the data, one should 
acknowledge the uncertainty about the model 
by considering the entire set of models, each 
perhaps weighted by its own strength of evi- 
dence (Buckland et al. 1997). 
Bayesian Approaches 
Bayesian approaches offer some alternatives 
preferable to the ordinary (often called fre- 
quentist, because they invoke the idea of the 
long-term frequency of outcomes in imagined 
repeats of experiments or samples) methods for 
hypothesis testing, as well as for estimation and 
decision-making. Space limitations preclude a 
detailed review of the approach here; see Box 
and Tiao (1973), Berger (1985), and Carlin and 
Louis (1996) for longer expositions, and Schmitt 
(1969) for an elementary introduction. 
Sometimes the value of a parameter is pre- 
dicted from theory, and it is more reasonable to 
test whether or not that value is consistent with 
the observed data than to calculate a confidence 
interval (Berger and Delampady 1987, Zellner 
1987). For testing such hypotheses, what is usu- 
ally desired (and what is sometimes believed to 
be provided by a statistical hypothesis test) is 
Pr[Ho I data]. What is obtained, as pointed out 
earlier, is P = Pr[observed or more extreme 
data I Ho]. Bayes' theorem offers a formula for 
converting between them. 
Pr[H0 data] = Pr[data H]Pr[H0] 
This is an old (Bayes 1763) and well-known the- 
orem in probability. Its use in the present sit- 
uation does not follow from the frequentist view 
of statistics, which considers Pr[Ho] as un- 
known, but either zero or 1. In the Bayesian 
approach, Pr[H0] is determined before data are 
gathered; it is therefore called the prior prob- 
ability of H0. Pr[H0] can be determined either 
subjectively (what is your prior belief about the 
truth of the null hypothesis?) or by a variety of 
objective means (e.g., Box and Tiao 1973, Car- 
lin and Louis 1996). The use of subjective prob- 
abilities is a major reason that Bayesian ap- 
proaches fell out of favor: science must be ob- 
jective! (The other main reason is that Bayesian 
calculations tend to get fairly heavy, but modern 
computer capabilities can largely overcome this 
obstacle.) 
Briefly consider parameter estimation. Sup- 
pose you want to estimate a parameter 0. Then 
replacing Ho by 0 in the above formula yields 
P [0d t ]- Pr[data I O]Pr[0], 
Pr[data] 
which provides an expression that shows how 
initial knowledge about the value of a parame- 
ter, reflected in the prior probability function 
Pr[0], is modified by data obtained from a study, 
Pr[data I 0], to yield a final probability function, 
Pr[0 I data]. This process of updating beliefs 
leads in a natural way to adaptive resource man- 
agement (Holling 1978, Walters 1986), a recent 
favorite topic in wildlife science (e.g., Walters 
and Green 1997). 
Bayesian confidence intervals are much more 
natural than their frequentist counterparts. A fre- 
quentist 95% confidence interval for a parameter 
0, denoted (0L, 0U), is interpreted as follows: if 
the study were repeated an infinite number of 
times, 95% of the confidence intervals that re- 
sulted would contain the true value 0. It says 
nothing about the particular study that was ac- 
tually conducted, which led Howson and Urbach 
(1991:373) to comment that "statisticians regu- 
larly say that one can be '95 per cent confident' 
that the parameter lies in the confidence interval. 
They never say why." In contrast, a Bayesian con- 
fidence interval, sometimes called a credible in- 
terval, is interpreted to mean that the probability 
that the true value of the parameter lies in the 
interval is 95%. That statement is much more 
natural, and is what people think a confidence 
interval is, until they get the notion drummed 
out of their heads in statistics courses. 
For decision analysis, Bayes' theorem offers 
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a very logical way to make decisions in the face 
of uncertainty. It allows for incorporating be- 
liefs, data, and the gains or losses expected from 
possible consequences of decisions. See Wolf- 
son et al. (1996) and Ellison (1996) for recent 
overviews of Bayesian methods with an ecolog- 
ical orientation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Editors of scientific journals, along with the 
referees they rely on, are really the arbiters of 
scientific practice. They need to understand 
how statistical methods can be used to reach 
sound conclusions from data that have been 
gathered. It is not sufficient to insist that au- 
thors use statistical methods-the methods 
must be appropriate to the application. The 
most common and flagrant misuse of statistics, 
in my view, is the testing of hypotheses, espe- 
cially the vast majority of them known before- 
hand to be false. 
With the hundreds of articles already pub- 
lished that decry the use of statistical hypothesis 
testing, I was somewhat hesitant about writing 
another. It contains nothing new. But still, read- 
ing The Journal of Wildlife Management makes 
me realize that the message has not really 
reached the audience of wildlife biologists. Our 
work is important, so we should use the best 
tools we have available. Rarely, however, is that 
tool statistical hypothesis testing. 
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